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Corporate Efficiency, Profitability, and Value 
Changes after the IPO
Daniel L. McConaughy, Manjeet S. Dhatt, and 
Yong H. Kim
I. INTRODUCTION
Agency theory predicts that when owner-managers sell a portion of their share 
in their firms, agency costs are incurred. They arise because the original 
owner-managers’ incentives change since they no longer bear all of the costs 
of the decisions they make. This suggests that when a firm undergoes an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO), agency costs should increase. An increase in agency 
costs should manifest itself in the form of reduced profitability, lower opera­
tional efficiency, and /o r lower firm value. This study compares the profitabil­
ity, operational efficiency, and firm value over the 1985-1990 period of 100 
firms that had IPOs in 1985 compared to a matched sample of similar firms 
which had their IPO before 1980. We find that the 1985 IPO firms were more 
profitable, operationally more efficient, had more liquid assets, and had 
greater value over the 1985-1990 period.
Much of the IPO literature has focused on the short run performance of 
IPOs and the hot and cold markets phenomenon (Downs & Heinkel, 1982; 
Leyland & Pyle, 1977; Ritter, 1991). Recently, Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1990) examine reverse leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Relative to a matched 
sample, they compare the operating-efficiency and capital structure of these 
firms just before they go private and then when they go public again. They 
find that the reverse LBO firms emerged from private ownership more 
profitable and productive. The changes in ownership affected by the LBOs 
allowed the assets of the firms to be put to higher uses—agency costs were 
reduced.
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The present research fills a gap in the IPO literature. An IPO is the 
opposite of an LBO relative to ownership changes. The LBO affects a less 
diffuse ownership structure, whereas the IPO affects a more diffuse one. Up 
to the present, no one has examined the effect of the diffusion of ownership 
caused by the IPO on corporate profitability, efficiency, and value. This study 
looks at the reverse of what Muscarella and Vetsuypens examine.
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n . PROBLEM
Research into corporate buyouts indicates that a concentration of ownership 
increases corporate efficiency. This result is in line with the predictions of 
agency theory, which also predicts that a diffusion of ownership increases 
agency costs which reduce firm value. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that 
the IPO would eventually increase agency costs.
Managerial incentives will change when ownership changes, and changes 
in managerial behavior will follow in response to the changes in incentives. 
Over time, these changes will manifest themselves in terms of changes in 
profitabihty, operational efficiency, and firm value. We predict that firms that 
undergo a diffusion of ownership via an IPO will become less profitable, less 
operationally efficient, and less valuable.
m. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The SEC’s “Registered Offering Securities” (ROS) computer tape was used 
as the sample data source to identify firms that had their IPO in 1985. We tise 
only “firm commitment” common stock offerings. To control for industry and 
size effects, we formed a control set of firms matched on the basis of the 
two-digit SIC code, or closer, and plus or minus 25 percent of sales as given 
by Compustat. We further defined the matched sample firms by requiring 
them to have had their IPO before 1980 so that the sample firms would be 
matched to firms which had existed for at least five years under a regime of 
diffuse ownership. This provided a set of 100 pairs of firms with annual mean 
sales of $82.7 million and median sales of $19.1 million in 1985. The largest 
firm had sales of $1804 million and the smallest, $0,184 million.
The pairs of firms are compared on the basis of the following calendar 
year ratios computed from Compustat: Gross Margin, Operating Margin, 
Sales/Employee, Cash Flow/Employee, Sales/Average Working Capital, Cur­
rent Ratio, Sales/Total Assets, Market-toBook Equity, and Market Equity/To­
tal Assets.
To test for significant differences in the median values of the data of the 
matched pairs of firms, we employed the Wilcoxon Signed-rank test for paired 
samples. Furthermore, to ascertain if the sets of firms differed significantly 
over the whole time period for a given ratio, we took the average of the median 
differences of each ratio for each one year period for each pair and tested if 




The IPO firms are slightiy more profitable. Operating margin was higher in 
each period, and the significance of the differences over the entire six year 
period is 0.11. Gross margin, after depreciation, was not significandy different 
for the two sets.
The current ratio was higher for the IPO firms in each period, but was 
nonsignificant in 1990. Nevertheless, over the whole period, the IPO firms 
were significandy higher at the 0.03 level of significance. The decline in 
liquidity most likely indicates that the sample firms put to work the cash 
received firom their IPOs in 1985. This is reflected also in sales/average 
working capital, which is significandy and increasingly higher in every period 
for the sample firms. Over the whole six year period, the significance of the 
difference is 0.002.
The IPO firms were operationally more efficient. Sales/employee was 
significandy higher in each period with a significance of 0.02 over the six 
years. Operating cash flow/employee behaved similarly, though it was much 
more variable, being significandy different at the 0.04 level over the period. 
Sales/total assets was initially lower for the sample firms but grew from 1987 
on though the results are insignificant.
The IPO firms were more valuable as measured by market equity/book 
equity and total market equity/total assets. In all periods the sample firms 
were highly significandy different, but the differences shrank markedly over 
the six year period. From 1985-1990, the differences were significant at the
0.0001 level. Fama and French (1992, p. 451) feel thatlow BE/ME firms have 
persistentiy strong economic performance. The market seems to impute 
increasing agency costs to firms after they go public.
V. CONCLUSION
To summarize, the sample IPO firms were modestly more profitable, increas­
ingly made working capital more productive, had more productive employ­
ees, and were valued more by investors than the control firais which had been 
public for at least five more years. Though the sample firms’ employees were 
consistently more productive and profitability was modesdy higher, the 
market imputed increasing expected agency costs as evidenced by a declining 
market premium. The IPO changes managerial incentives which increase 
agency costs for several years after the IPO.
NOTE
We have extended this study to 1992 and examined rates of change in the 
financial ratios. The operating performance of the IPO firms significandy 
improved over the 1990-92 period, suggesting that earlier investments were 
paying off. The IPOs’ continued superior operating performance, along with 
inferior stock market performance, suggests that investors overpay for the 
growth prospects of firms at their IPO.
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